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I. INTRODUCTION
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a free trade agreement among twelve
Pacific Rim countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and
Vietnam.1 Each of these countries is also a signatory of the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which currently
provides the international intellectual property standards.2 Despite failing to
reach an agreement during the negotiations in July 2015,3 the countries met
again in September 2015 to continue efforts to finalize the treaty.4 On October
5, 2015, the twelve countries announced that the treaty had been finalized,
although the final version of the treaty was not signed at that time.5 After the
TPP was finalized, the United States Trade Representative released the final text
of the Intellectual Property Chapter.6
The TPP contains a wide range of provisions on traditional trade topics,
such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property, and dispute settlement,
and on a number of non-traditional trade topics, such as labor,
telecommunications, and e-commerce.7 The wide variety of topics the treaty
addresses and the non-transparent manner in which negotiations have been
conducted have fueled the controversy surrounding the treaty.8

1 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OVERVIEW OF THE TRANS
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2009), https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP.
2 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, CONTRACTING PARTIES/SIGNATORIES :
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS
AGREEMENT), http://www.wipo.int/wipo/ex/on/other_treaties/parties/jsp?treaty_id=231&gro
ve-id=22 (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) [hereinafter WIPO].
3 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., JOINT STATEMENT BY TPP MINISTERS (July 2015).
4 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., UNITED STATES TO HOST TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
TRADE MINISTERS’ MEETING IN ATLANTA (Sept. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offic
es/press-releases/2015/September/United-States-host-trans-pacific.
5 Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal is Reached but Faces Scrutiny in Congress, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnershiptrade-deal-is-reached.html.
6 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Ch. 18, drafted Oct. 5, 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/def
ault/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property.pdf [hereinafter TPP].
7 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., TPP ISSUE-BY-ISSUE INFORMATION CENTER, https://ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-issue-issue-negotiati
ng-objectives (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
8 See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Job Loss, Lower Wages, and Higher Drug Prices, PUBLIC
CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/TPP (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) (stating that the TPP is not a
“free trade” agreement as it only specifically addresses trade issues in five of the twenty-nine draft
chapters).
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Despite the controversy surrounding the TPP, this agreement follows other
significant trade agreements in covering intellectual property. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was implemented in 1994,
was an agreement among the United States, Mexico, and Canada.9 The NAFTA
provisions provided that patents be made available “for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that such inventions
are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”10
Additionally, NAFTA sought to protect trade by ensuring that intellectual
property rights, including patent protections, were not enforced so as to offer
protection to domestic products.11 As a result, the United States had to permit
reliance on activities occurring in other NAFTA countries to prove a date of
invention and adopt a twenty-year patent term.12 Since the implementation of
NAFTA, numerous trade agreements between the United States and other
countries have implemented similar intellectual property provisions.13
Additionally, the United States entered into TRIPS as part of the Uruguay
Rounds Agreement in 1994, which was finalized through the Marrakesh
Agreement and established the World Trade Organization (WTO).14 TRIPS is
the most significant step taken to date towards the creation of a uniform system
of intellectual property rights and enforcement. For patents, TRIPS provides
that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.”15 TRIPS also provides
an international mechanism for resolving disputes that arise regarding
intellectual property rights. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO
hears cases arising under TRIPS and these cases are subjected to the procedures

9 North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1709:1, Dec. 17 1992, 107 Stat. 2061 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
10 Id.
11 NAFTA: The First Major International Trade Agreement to Protect IP Rights, MILLER CANFIELD,
http://www.millercanfield.com/media/article/200162_IP%20Rights.pdf (last visited Dec. 16,
2016).
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Korea Free Trade Agreement, ch. 18, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007, 19 U.S.C. § 3805
(note to statute confirming the United States and Korean Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act).
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 407
[hereinafter TRIPS].
15 Id. art. 27:1.
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established under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).16 Additionally,
TRIPS provides the foundation for the TPP’s Intellectual Property Chapter.17
In Part II, this Note will examine the domestic patent protections in the
United States and the international patent provisions established under TRIPS
and how the DSB has resolved conflicts that arise under TRIPS’ patent
provisions. In Part III, this Note will evaluate how the TPP’s patent provisions
fit within the framework established by NAFTA and TRIPS. To do so, this
Note will explore any changes to existing United States patent provisions that
might occur through the adoption of the TPP. Finally, in Part IV, this Note
will examine the economic benefits that will accrue to the United States through
the adoption of the patent provisions in the TPP. Additionally, this Note will
explain why the accrual of economic benefits outweighs the public health
concerns at the center of the controversy surrounding the TPP patent
provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
The intellectual property provisions of the TPP will have to fit into the
existing framework provided for patents in TRIPS, to which the United States
Code (U.S.C.) already conforms. The U.S.C. provides the existing domestic
framework for patent protection and enforcement, including potential remedies.
Meanwhile, TRIPS provides the international framework for patent protection
and enforcement.
A. PATENTABLE MATERIAL UNDER THE UNITED STATES’ DOMESTIC PATENT
PROVISIONS

The United States has enacted statutes to determine a product’s
patentability. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 101 states that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patentable.18 Under this standard, the United
States allows inventors patent new products, processes, and novel
improvements of existing goods. The courts in the United States have

16 Id. art. 64:1; see generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (the DSU permits DSB panels and the appellate
body to hear disputes arising under TRIPS).
17 See, e.g., TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.1 (definition of “intellectual property” relies on concepts
covered under TRIPS).
18 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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interpreted the utility requirement to require merely that a purported invention
have some beneficial use.19 Additionally, the United States only requires that an
inventor set forth the best mode of application when applying for a patent.20
This allows inventors to specify one use of a product when applying for a
patent while also having the option to renew the product when a new use for
the product is discovered. This option allows inventors to extend their
exclusive use of a product through a practice known as “evergreening.”21
Evergreening is a popular practice for pharmaceutical companies, which extend
the effective life of their patent, often well beyond the statutory period of
twenty years, to prevent cheaper generic drugs from entering the market.22
Furthermore, under the utility prong of analysis, the Supreme Court has held
that the invention must have an actual function at the time the inventor files for
the patent to fulfill the utility requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 101.23 The fact that an
invention may have a possible use does not make the invention patentable. If
there is no definitive use for the invention when the inventor files for the
patent, the patent will be rejected.24
Once an inventor has shown a product’s utility, he must still demonstrate
the invention’s novelty. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a), a person will be granted a
patent unless “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication (or in public use), on sale, or otherwise available to the public
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”25 While the prior
patent or description is applicable to actions taken in the United States and
abroad, the public use, availability to the public, and sale of a prior invention
exclusions require that the actions be taken only in the United States.26 Under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a), there is a presumption that an invention is novel.27 While
there are exceptions to the rule established in 35 U.S.C. § 102,28 these

19 See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1966) (citing the utility requirements first
set forth in Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817)).
20 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
21 Burcu Kilic, What is Patentable Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership? An Analysis of the Free Trade
Agreement’s Patentability Provisions from a Public Health Perspective, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 2–3
(2015).
22 Id. at 4–5.
23 See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–33.
24 Id.
25 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
26 Id. § 102(a)–(b).
27 Id. § 102(a).
28 See generally id. § 102(b) (enumerating exceptions to the prior art requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)).
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exceptions address when an invention should be granted a patent even when
prohibited under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Additionally, the United States requires that an invention be of a nonobvious subject matter. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 states that “[a] patent for a
claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date.”29 This section
requires that the subject matter of the claimed invention must be obvious to a
person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.30 The Supreme Court has held
that under 35 U.S.C. § 103, four factors must be used to evaluate the
obviousness, or lack thereof, of a claimed invention: (1) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; (2) scope and content of the prior art; (3) differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art, and; (4) secondary considerations.31
Courts have determined the level of ordinary skill in the art by evaluating the
qualifications of the inventor, the education level of a typical worker in the art,
how quickly new innovations arise in the art, and the sophistication of the
technology used in the art.32 Furthermore, courts have evaluated the scope and
content of prior art by examining 35 U.S.C. § 102 to determine what qualifies as
prior art.33 The definition of prior art is restrained by requiring that invention
and the prior art must fall within the same art or another art which is reasonably
pertinent to the invention to prevent an invention from being patentable.34
Additionally, courts have found that there must be some appreciable difference
between the prior art and the claimed invention; otherwise, the claimed
invention would be barred under 35 U.S.C. § 102.35 Finally, the courts evaluate
a number of secondary considerations, including objective indicia of nonobviousness, such as the commercial success of the prior art, the failure of
others to solve the problem the invention addresses, and the need for the
invention.36

Id. § 103.
Id.
31 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 15.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) (finding that an
invention which is not sufficiently different from the prior art fails under both the novelty and
non-obvious tests).
36 Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503–04 (2d Cir. 1960).
29
30
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B. RIGHTS CONFERRED TO PATENT HOLDERS IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States patent statutory framework confers certain rights upon
patent holders. For a patented product, no party may make, use, offer for sale,
sell, or import the product within the United States without the patent holder’s
consent.37 Additionally, for any patented process, no party may use, offer for
sale, sell, or import the process within the United States.38 These prohibitions,
combined with enforcement mechanisms, allow patent holders to exercise a
near monopoly on the market for their invention for the twenty years the patent
remains in effect.
C. POTENTIAL REMEDIES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR PATENT
INFRINGEMENT

In the United States, the remedies for a patent infringement claim lie in civil
court, not criminal court.39 A party is found to have infringed upon a patent
when they make, use, offer to sell, or sell any patented invention without the
patent owner’s permission.40 Additionally, the United States also prohibits the
sale or importation of any component of a patented invention that constitutes a
material aspect of the invention.41 If the court determines that a party has
violated 35 U.S.C. § 271, then a number of remedies are available to the
complaining party.
The United States civil enforcement of patents allows the recovery of many
different forms of damages. First, injured parties can seek injunctive relief to
prevent continued infringement.42 If a party does not wish to seek injunctive
relief, the courts can also award compensatory damages to the injured party.43
Compensatory damages must not be less than a reasonable royalty for the use
of the invention, including costs and interest, as determined by the court.44
Finally, the courts can award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in
exceptional circumstances.45 A potential amendment to this section is before
Congress, which would change the requirement for attorney fees from
exceptional circumstances to bringing or contesting an action in a manner that
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
Id. § 154(d)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 281.
Id. § 271(a).
Id. § 271(c).
Id. § 283.
Id. § 284.
Id.
Id. § 285.
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is not objectively reasonable.46 This amendment would make the award of
attorney fees more readily available.47
D. PATENTABILITY PROVISIONS UNDER TRIPS AND NAFTA

TRIPS, signed in 1994, is a multilateral agreement creating uniform,
minimum requirements for the patentability of inventions.48 As of 2015, TRIPS
had 161 contracting parties.49 Furthermore, TRIPS provides a similar
framework for the patentability of a product as that found in United States
statutes.
Article 27 of TRIPS details the patentable subject matter under the
agreement. This article states that “patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”50
Footnote 5 to the agreement states that the phrase “inventive step” is
synonymous with a non-obvious use, while the phrase “capable of industrial
application” is synonymous with useful.51 Additionally, Article 33 provides for
a twenty year patent term.52 However, Article 27 does not allow the renewal of
a patent when a new use of an existing product is discovered, thereby
preventing inventors from undertaking evergreening.53
Article 27 also provides limited exceptions to the patentability of inventions.
Under this article, countries may exclude inventions from patentability if doing
so “is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
animal, or plant life. . . .”54 Article 27 further states that countries can exclude
“diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treatments of humans or
animals, and genetically modified plants and animals.”55 These exceptions are
limited so that countries cannot exclude inventions from patentability merely
because the patentability of the products is prohibited under their law,56
meaning that the presumption for patentability found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103
is also present under TRIPS.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

S. REP. NO. 114-1, at 1137 (2015).
Id.
See TRIPS, supra note 14.
See WIPO, supra note 2.
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27:1.
See id. art. 27:1 n.5.
See id. art. 33.
See Kilic, supra note 21, at 4.
See TRIPS, supra note 14¸ art. 27:2.
Id. art. 27:3.
Id. art. 27:2.
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Another important provision in TRIPS is Article 31, which allows for the
compulsory licensing of patented inventions.57 Through the compulsory
licensing mechanism, individual countries can permit the production of generic
pharmaceuticals. To do so, the country must have made reasonable efforts to
obtain authorization from the right holder.58 If the patent holder fails to
address the request from the licensee within a reasonable time, the country can
mandate that a license be granted, so long as the country will produce the
product predominantly for the domestic market.59 However, if a country
obtains a license under Article 31, the country must pay the patent holder
“adequate remuneration in the circumstances.”60
In 1994, the United States entered into NAFTA with Mexico and Canada. 61
This free trade agreement also addresses intellectual property concerns. Article
1709:1 of NAFTA provides that patents are available “for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that such
inventions are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.”62 NAFTA, like TRIPS, correlates “inventive step” with nonobvious uses and “capable of industrial application” with useful.63 NAFTA also
contains the same exclusions to patentability that are present in TRIPS, though
NAFTA also permits the exclusion of biological processes for the creation of
plants or animals.64 Furthermore, under NAFTA, like in the United States and
under TRIPS, an invention is presumably eligible for a patent.65
E. RIGHTS CONFERRED TO PATENT HOLDERS UNDER TRIPS AND NAFTA

The rights conferred upon patent holders under TRIPS and NAFTA are
substantially similar. Under TRIPS Article 28:1(a), a patented product cannot
be made, used, offered for sale, sold, or imported without the patent holder’s
consent.66 Additionally, under TRIPS Article 28:1(b), a patented process cannot
Id. art. 31.
Id. art. 31(b).
59 Id. art. 31(b), (f).
60 Id. art. 31(h).
61 See NAFTA, supra note 9.
62 Id. art. 1709:1.
63 Id.
64 Compare TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27:2–3 (enumerating exceptions from patentability on
moral grounds, for medical processes, and genetically modified organisms), with NAFTA, supra
note 9, art. 1709:2–3 (enumerating exceptions from patentability on moral grounds, for medical
processes, genetically modified organisms, and biological processes).
65 NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1709:1 (stating that “each Party shall make patents available”
(emphasis added)).
66 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 28:1(a).
57
58
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be used, offered for sale, sold, or imported without the patent holder’s
consent.67
Meanwhile, under NAFTA Article 1709:5(a), a patented product cannot be
made, used, or sold without the patent holder’s consent.68 The only difference
between the NAFTA provision regarding patented products and the
corresponding TRIPS and United States provisions is that under NAFTA,
offering a patented product for sale is not patent infringement unless the
product is actually sold.69 Although, the United States requirement is stricter
than the NAFTA requirements, the United States complies with NAFTA
because NAFTA merely provides a minimum standard for patent protection.
Finally, under NAFTA Article 1709:5(b), a patented process cannot be used,
sold, or imported without the patent holder’s consent.70 Again, the restriction
on offering a patented process for sale is absent under NAFTA while it is
present under TRIPS and the United States provisions.71
While differences exist between the NAFTA provisions and the United
States and TRIPS provisions, these differences do not represent material
differences among the schemes, as offering a product or process for sale is an
element of actually selling the product. Therefore, under NAFTA the act must
be completed, while under TRIPS and the United States provisions, the act of
selling does not need to be completed.
F. DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT PROVISIONS UNDER TRIPS AND
NAFTA

While both NAFTA and TRIPS provide a framework for minimum
protections for patent holders, both treaties allow countries to institute policies
which provide more extensive protection for patent rights.72 Additionally, both
treaties provide that the signatory countries shall make the domestic civil courts
available for any suit involving patent infringement.73 Under TRIPS and
NAFTA, the civil courts have the authority to award the patent holder
injunctive relief,74 compensatory damages,75 and reasonable attorney fees.76
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. art. 28:1(b).
See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1709:5(a).
Compare id., with TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 28:1(a); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1709:5(b).
Compare id., with TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 28:1(b); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 1:1; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1702.
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 42; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(1).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 44:1; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(c).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:1; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(d).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:2; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(e).
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Additionally, under NAFTA, a court may award compensation, including
compensatory damages and attorney fees, to a party accused of infringement
when the complaining party has abused the enforcement procedures.77
However, the treaty does not define abuse of the enforcement procedures and
the NAFTA dispute resolution body has not addressed the issue. Therefore, it
remains unclear under what circumstances a party accused of infringement
under NAFTA can recover attorney fees or compensatory damages.
G. INTERPRETATION OF TRIPS PROVISIONS BY THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
BODY OF THE WTO

While evaluating the NAFTA patent provisions is beneficial to examine the
framework of international patent agreements, the agreement does not provide an
effective avenue for interpretation of the agreement, as NAFTA disputes are
settled through arbitration.78 However, TRIPS provides an effective instrument
for interpretation of the treaty terms, as the agreement is subject to dispute
resolution in the DSB of the WTO.79 However, since TRIPS was adopted in
1994, the member countries have only brought nine cases before a DSB panel.80
Of these nine panel cases, only four have dealt directly with the patent
Furthermore, the India—Patents cases dealt with the
provisions.81
implementation of TRIPS provisions when TRIPS came into effect, rendering
these decisions obsolete in evaluating the regular TRIPS scheme, as India was
granted certain concessions while implementing TRIPS.82 Meanwhile, the
trademark dispute between the United States and China regarding Chinese
censorship of trademarked materials best demonstrates how the DSB panels will

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(f).
Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions, NAFTA Secretariat, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.
org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Overview-of-the-Dispute-Settlement-Provisions (last visited Oct.
25, 2015).
79 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 64.
80 Marina Foltea, WTO Cases Involving TRIPS Agreement, Turin University (Nov. 18, 2013), http://
www.turin-ip.com/paste-editions/2013-edition/training-material-2013/Ms.%20Foltea/Lecture%20
18nov13.pdf.
81 Dispute Settlement Cases in the Area of TRIPS (as of March 2015), World Trade Organization,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/6_tabledscases_e.pdf (last visited Oct.
25, 2015).
82 Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter India – Patents]; Panel
Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS79/3 (adopted Nov. 27, 1997) [hereinafter India – Patents II].
77
78

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss1/5

12

Adams: Combating the Anti-trade Movement: Evaluating the Trans-Pacific P

2016]

COMBATING THE ANTI-TRADE MOVEMENT

87

apply TRIPS enforcement provisions.83 These panel and appellate body decisions
highlight how the member countries and DSB interpret TRIPS provisions.
While China—IPRs addresses the United States’ concerns about China’s
censorship of trademarked material and how China disposes of censored
material, the case provides analysis of TRIPS Article 41, which states that
enforcement measures under TRIPS shall be made available under each
member countries’ laws.84 The panel held that China’s policy did not allow
countries whose goods violated the censorship provision an actual opportunity
to gain relief for any violation.85 The panel reasoned that although China
allowed countries to appeal any decisions regarding the rejection of a trademark
to the Chinese courts, these appellate procedures failed to provide an effective
opportunity for relief under TRIPS Articles 44, 45, 46, and 50.86 While the
Appellate Body decided this case in the context of a dispute about trademarks,
this interpretation of Article 41 should also apply to any dispute brought under
the patent provisions of TRIPS. Therefore, under the patent provisions,
countries must afford an effective opportunity for relief and effective appellate
procedures.
Additionally, in Canada-Patent Term, the Appellate Body interpreted Canada’s
implementation of TRIPS Article 33, which requires members to provide a
patent period of twenty years from the filing date.87 The appellate body held
that Article 33 requires that each country, upon adopting TRIPS, should
implement an effective patent period of at least twenty years from the filing
date.88 This decision demonstrates the Appellate Body’s tendency to apply the
plain meaning of TRIPS provisions.
Finally, in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, the panel evaluated whether elements
of Canada’s Patent Act fell under the general exceptions to TRIPS patent
provisions found in TRIPS Article 30.89 The panel interpreted Article 27.1 to
prohibit both de jure and de facto discrimination based on a product’s field of
technology.90 However, the panel held that the European Community (EC)
had not provided sufficient evidence that the stockpiling provision of Canada’s
83 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China – IPRs].
84 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 41.
85 See China – IPRs, supra note 83, ¶ 7.178.
86 See id. ¶ 7.179.
87 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 33.
88 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Term of Patent Protection, ¶ 85, WTO Doc. WT/DS170/AB/R
(adopted Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Canada – Patent Term].
89 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R
(adopted Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents].
90 Id. ¶ 7.98.
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Patent Act was a violation of TRIPS Article 27.1.91 Additionally, the panel
highlighted that the EC had conceded that Canada’s Patent Act did not limit its
actions solely to pharmaceutical products.92 Since the European Community,
the complaining party, failed to prove their prima facie case, the panel found no
violation of Article 30.
These cases demonstrate that the DSB interpret TRIPS provisions narrowly.
In these cases, with the exception of China—IPRs, the panels and appellate
body strictly interpreted the terms of the treaty. However, in China—IPRs the
panel interpreted TRIPS Article 41 to require an effective avenue for relief in
domestic courts, rather than just the possibility for relief.93 The panel’s
interpretation of Article 41 represents a slight expansion of the TRIPS
provisions.
Finally, the lack of cases brought before the DSB under TRIPS94
demonstrates either that member countries have largely brought their domestic
regulations into conformance with TRIPS or that member countries are wary of
bringing disputes under TRIPS lest they upset the delicate balance that prevails
in international trade. Despite the lack of complaints brought under TRIPS, the
cases that have been brought under TRIPS demonstrate that countries either
conform to the TRIPS provisions or other member countries will bring a
complaint before the DSB for any gross deviations from the TRIPS provisions.
H. UNITED STATES TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

With the finalization of the TPP, the final terms of the treaty must be signed
by the negotiating parties. After the treaty is signed, the United States Congress
must ratify the treaty. As with most trade agreements, the TPP will go through
ratification as a congressional-executive agreement, which merely requires that
both houses of Congress pass the implementing legislation rather than requiring
two-thirds of the Senate voting to ratify the treaty.95 The United States
Congress confirmed that the TPP would be subjected to the congressionalexecutive agreement procedure, commonly referred to as “fast track”

Id. ¶¶ 7.99–7.100.
Id. ¶ 7.95.
93 See China – IPRs, supra note 83, ¶ 7.165.
94 See Foltea, supra note 80, at 5 (showing that only 3% of all complaints filed in the WTO have
been brought under TRIPS).
95 See Jane M. Smith et al., Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive
Agreements Rather Than Treaties, Congressional Research Service, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97
-896.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
91
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procedures, when both houses passed the Trade Promotion Authority Act
(TPA) on June 24, 2015.96
TPA provides guidelines for the negotiations of any trade agreement,
including objectives for the negotiation of intellectual property provisions in the
TPP. Congress set out explicit objectives for the negotiation of intellectual
property provisions, including that during negotiations, the executive branch
should seek to “promote the adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights.”97 Congress reasoned that the most effective way to protect
intellectual property rights was through the full implementation of TRIPS by all
negotiating parties.98 This requirement would ensure that the intellectual
property provisions of any trade agreement would reflect the standards in the
United States and provide strong enforcement mechanisms against the
infringement of intellectual property rights.99
Furthermore, TPA states that if the executive branch fulfills the objectives
set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 4201, then both houses of Congress will either adopt or
reject the implementing legislation for the treaty without amendment.100
However, 19 U.S.C. § 4205 provides other procedures that the executive branch
must follow, such as publically releasing the final version of the agreement at
least sixty days prior to entering into the agreement.101 These provisions ensure
that Congress is well informed of the terms of the agreement prior to a vote on
the implementing legislation. These provisions are important because the
implementing legislation of a congressional-executive agreement does not
enumerate the provisions of the agreement; it merely states Congress’s decision
to adopt the terms of the agreement.102
Therefore, TPA ensures that Congress will either adopt or reject the final
terms of the TPP with no amendments made to those terms during the
ratification process. The lack of amendments during the ratification process is
important for the analysis of the TPP’s final terms. Since Congress cannot
change the obligations the United States will incur if the treaty is adopted and
ratified, the terms can be examined with certainty.

96 Jonathan Weisman, Trade Authority Bill Wins Final Approval in Senate, June 24, 2015, N.Y.
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/business/trade-pact-senate-vote-obama.html.
97 19 U.S.C. § 4201(b)(5) (2012).
98 Id. § 4201(b)(5)(A)(i)–(v).
99 Id.
100 Id. § 4205(a)(1)(F).
101 Id. § 4205(a)(1)(B).
102 See, e.g., id. § 3311(a)(1) (stating that “Congress approves the North American Free Trade
Agreement entered into on December 17, 1992”).
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III. ANALYSIS
On October 5, 2015, the negotiating countries agreed on the final draft of
the TPP.103 However, since the agreement has not been signed, no country has
an obligation to implement the final terms.104 However, the official release of
the TPP provisions will allow the already vigorous public discourse regarding
the desirability of the treaty to continue. By analyzing the terms of the final
Intellectual Property Chapter, as released by the United State Trade
Representative (USTR), this Note will evaluate how these terms fit within the
existing framework of patent provisions established through TRIPS and within
the United States. Additionally, these terms allow the analysis of the benefits
that will accrue to the United States through the adoption of the TPP
Intellectual Property Chapter.
A. FINAL TERMS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CHAPTER ON PRODUCT PATENTABILITY

Many argue that the TPP would establish an intellectual property regime that
is commonly referred to as a “TRIPS-plus Agreement,” meaning that the terms
of the TPP will expand on the intellectual property provisions found in
TRIPS.105 However, the final terms of the TPP show that the patentability
provisions would not expand the TRIPS regime. TPP Article 18.37 (1)
provides that “each Party shall make patents available for any invention,
whether a product or process, in all fields of technology, provided that the
invention is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial
application.”106 Footnote 30 to the agreement defines “an inventive step” and
“capable of industrial application” as synonymous with “non-obvious” and
“useful.”107 When comparing this provision with TRIPS Article 27, the two
provisions are exactly the same. Both provisions provide that a product is
patentable if it is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial

See Calmes, supra note 5.
Jonathan Weisman, Trade Authority Bill Wins Final Approval in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/business/trade-pact-senate-vote-obama.html.
105 See, e.g., Trading Away Health: How the US’s Intellectual Property Demands for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement Threaten Access to Medicines, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (MSF) ACCESS
CAMPAIGN, Aug. 2012, https://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/Access/Do
cs/Access_Briefing_TPP_Eng_2012_update.pdf (arguing that TPP provisions would create a
TRIPS-plus regime).
106 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.37(1).
107 See id. art. 30.
103
104
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application.108 Additionally, the footnote to each provision defines “an
inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” as synonymous with
“non-obvious” and “useful.”109 Therefore, the terms of the TPP do not create
additional obligations regarding the general patentability of products under
TRIPS. Furthermore, since the domestic U.S. patent provisions have already
been brought into alignment with the TRIPS provisions, the TPP would not
affect the patentability provisions found in 19 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. Finally, since
the TPP is silent regarding the patent period, the TRIPS patent period of
twenty years will remain in effect.110
While the general terms of patentability are the same under the TPP as those
established by TRIPS, the TPP does further clarify the definition of a product’s
usefulness. Article 18.37(2) states that each member should make patents
available for inventions which are “new uses of a known product, new methods
of using a known product, or new processes of using a known product.”111
Although this provision merely serves to clarify what constitutes an inventive
step under the TPP, there is no equivalent provision in TRIPS, and the DSB
has not had the opportunity to decide whether the TPP definition of an
“inventive step” would also apply under TRIPS. Therefore, this provision
could represent a slight extension of TRIPS regarding what constitutes an
inventive step.
However, the additional provision in the TPP would not affect the domestic
provisions in the United States. In the United States, domestic law provides a
presumption that a product is a novel concept.112 A product is deemed not to
be novel, and therefore it is not patentable, only if a like product has already
been patented, is described in a printed publication, or available for public
use.113 Therefore, the TPP provision allowing for the patentability of any new
use of an existing product would be permissible under the presumption of
patentability present in the United States.

Compare id. art. 18.37(1), with TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27.
TPP, supra note 6, n.30; TRIPS, supra note 14, n.5.
110 See TPP, supra note 6 (noting that the TPP Patent Provisions are silent regarding patent term
lengths).
111 See id. art. 18.37(2).
112 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
113 Id. § 102(a).
108
109
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B. IMPORTANCE OF EXCEPTIONS TO PATENTABILITY UNDER THE TPP FOR
ALLEVIATING CONCERNS ABOUT PUBLIC HEALTH

The TPP provides for the same general exceptions to patentability that can
be found in TRIPS. TPP Article 18.37(3) provides that a country may exclude
products from patentability if it is necessary to protect public morality, to
protect human, animal, or plant life.114 Additionally, each party can exclude
diagnostic and surgical methods from patentability.115 Finally, under the TPP, a
country can exclude microorganisms and biological processes from
patentability.116 When comparing these general exceptions found in the TPP to
those found in TRIPS Articles 27.2 and 27.3, each provision allows for the
exclusion of the same products.117 Additionally, the TPP provides that the
compulsory licensing provisions in TRIPS Article 31 still apply to the TPP
patent provisions.118 Therefore, the general exceptions of the TPP do not limit
the corresponding general exceptions found under TRIPS.
These exceptions to the TPP serve to limit concerns that pharmaceutical
companies will attempt to extend the patent period of essential medicines.119
One of the major concerns regarding the TPP patent provisions is that the
provisions will allow pharmaceutical companies to prevent the advent of
generic drugs through the practice of “evergreening.”120 However, Article 18.37
(3) provides that countries can refuse to grant a patent if doing so would be
harmful to human life or health.121 Additionally, the TPP also invokes the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.122 The Doha
Declaration recognized the gravity of public health problems and stated that
TRIPS should be part of the international action taken to address these public
health concerns.123 To do so, the declaration allows countries to use the
exceptions in TRIPS to promote access to medicines.124 Furthermore, TPP
Article 18.6 (1)(a) allows countries to invoke the Doha Declaration to protect

See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.37(3).
See id.
116 See id. art. 18.37(3)–(4).
117 Compare id., with TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 27:2–:3.
118 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.41 (stating that nothing in the TPP limits a Party’s rights under
TRIPS Article 31).
119 See, e.g., Kilic, supra note 21.
120 Id.
121 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.37(3).
122 See id. art. 18.50(3).
123 Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference — Fourth Session, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov.
14, 2001).
124 Id. ¶ 4.
114
115
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public health without fear of violating the TPP.125 These provisions provide
countries with the instruments necessary to combat “evergreening” and serve to
alleviate concerns that the TPP patent provisions will endanger international
public health initiatives, which rely on generic drugs.
Additionally, Article 18.53, which defines a new pharmaceutical product as a
chemical entity that has not been previously patented in the country,126 could
possibly be used to further limit the patentability of medicines. While this
article references the pharmaceutical data protection provisions in Article 18.50,
it is possible that this definition of a new pharmaceutical product could be used
to prohibit evergreening.
Regardless of the applicability of Article 18.53 to the patentability of
pharmaceuticals, the TPP provides exceptions to patentability consistent with
the exceptions in TRIPS. Countries can use these exceptions to combat
potential abuse of the domestic patent regime. These exceptions serve to
alleviate the concerns about the potential detrimental effect of the TPP on
public health.
C. FINAL TERMS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON ENFORCEMENT OF
PATENT PROVISIONS

The TPP provides enforcement provisions similar to those found in TRIPS.
TPP Article 18.71(1) provides that “[e]ach Party shall ensure that enforcement
procedures as specified in this Section are available under its law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement. . . .”127 This provision in the
TPP corresponds with Article 41 of TRIPS, which provides that “[m]embers
shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement. . . .”128 The TPP provision regarding the obligation to implement
a domestic scheme to enforce provisions of the agreement is exactly the same
as the provision found in TRIPS.
Since the TPP and TRIPS both create the obligation to create a domestic
scheme to enforce the relevant provisions of the agreements, the relevant
provisions must be evaluated to determine if the TPP creates additional
obligations. First, under TPP Article 18.74(1), the remedy for any infringement
of a patent will lie in civil courts, not criminal courts.129 The civil remedy for
125
126
127
128
129

See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.6(1)(a).
See id. art. 18.53.
See id. art. 18.71(1).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 41.
See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(1).
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patent infringement is also found in the United States domestic regime130 and
TRIPS.131
Second, the TPP states that compensatory damages must be available to the
complaining party should they prevail over the infringing party.132
Compensatory damages may include lost profits, fair market value of the
infringed goods, or suggested retail price.133 TRIPS, like the TPP, allows for the
recovery of compensatory damages when the complaining party prevails.134
However, TRIPS does not explain which losses can be used to calculate
compensatory damages. The drafters of the TPP illustrate what constitutes
compensatory damages while the TRIPS drafters fail to do so. This additional
clarity does create obligations beyond those found in TRIPS, as domestic courts
are now restricted in how they can calculate compensatory damages.
Additionally, these TPP provisions will restrict the calculation of compensatory
damages for patent infringement in the United States, as the United States
currently only provides a minimum amount for compensatory damages,
equivalent to a reasonable royalty fee.135
The TPP also permits domestic courts to grant injunctive relief to a
complaining party, as long as such relief conforms to TRIPS Article 44.136
Since this provision relies on TRIPS Article 44 to limit its applicability, this
provision clearly adheres to the TRIPS enforcement provision regarding
injunctive relief. However, the TPP also states that should any party request a
temporary injunction prior to litigation and abuse the relief, that party shall
“provide to a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate compensation
for the injury suffered. . . .”137 This provision is in place to prevent parties from
frivolously requesting a preliminary injunction. However, TRIPS has no such
provision.138 Therefore, this provision creates a new obligation for the parties
to the TPP. Additionally, the United States does not have any such provision in
the existing enforcement regime.139 Therefore, the United States will have to
amend 19 U.S.C. § 283 to include provisions allowing a wrongfully enjoined
party to recover against the complaining party.

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 42.
Id. TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(3).
See id. art. 18.74(4).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:1.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(5).
See id. art. 18.74(15).
See TRIPS, supra note 14.
See 19 U.S.C. § 283.
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Finally, the TPP dictates that each country should allow the prevailing party
to recover their reasonable attorney fees.140 This provision is compatible with
the TRIPS regime, which also allows the recovery of reasonable attorney fees.141
Therefore, the TPP does not create a new obligation regarding the recovery of
attorney fees. Furthermore, this TPP provision does not necessitate a change
to the United States domestic policy, as the United States already allows for the
recovery of reasonable attorney fees.142
D. ECONOMIC BENEFITS THAT WILL ACCRUE TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER
THE PATENT REGIME IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

The TPP intellectual property provisions represent a potential boom for the
United States economy. While many argue that the TPP will be harmful to the
United States, these concerns do not address the benefits that will accrue to the
United States under the intellectual property provisions.143 Instead, the
concerns around the intellectual property provisions focus on the effects on
public health in other countries, which are addressed earlier in this Note.
Additionally, the United States stands to gain significant benefits from the
implementation of the intellectual property provisions in the TPP.
The United States economy relies on IP-intensive industries. In 2010, IPintensive industries made up 34.8% of the United States’ Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), accounted for 60.7% of the United States’ merchandise
exports, provided 18.8% of American jobs, and accounted for 19% of all
United States private services exports in 2007.144 Patent-intensive industries
alone made up 5.3% of the United States’ GDP and provided 2.7% of
American jobs.145 Additionally, between 2010 and 2011, patent-intensive
industries experienced a 2.3% growth rate, which outpaced the non-IP-intensive
industries in the United States.146 The significant increase in patents granted
between 2013 and 2014 further demonstrates the growth of patent-intensive

TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(11).
See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:2.
142 35 U.S.C. § 285.
143 See, e.g., Richard Trumka, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Is a Bad Deal for American Workers, TIME
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://time.com/4065267/trans-pacific-partnership-american-workers.
144 Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: Industries in Focus, Economics and Statistics
Administration and United States Patent and Trademark Office (Mar. 2012), http://www.uspto.
gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf.
145 Id.
146 Id.
140
141
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industries within the United States.147 This economic data highlights the
importance of IP-intensive industries within the United States economy.
The importance of IP-intensive industries, specifically patent-intensive
industries, demonstrates the possible impact of any changes to the intellectual
property regime resulting from the TPP. The TPP will serve to create uniform
patent provisions in the twelve signing countries. The importance of this
uniformity cannot be understated. The twelve parties to the TPP combine to
make up nearly 40% of global GDP, providing an exceptionally large, uniform
market for United States’ patent-intensive industries.148 Additionally, the
United States will have to make no significant changes to the existing domestic
regime to conform to the TPP.149 Meanwhile, countries that have not
implemented effective intellectual property protection schemes will have to
raise their domestic standards to conform to the TPP.150 The TPP implements
these stringent intellectual property standards to promote innovation in patentintensive industries, benefitting those countries that have strong patentintensive industries, such as the United States.151
By creating uniformity in the market and opening new markets to United
States industries, the TPP will induce the patent-intensive industries within the
United States to expand the exportation of their products, as the uncertainty
costs inherent in a non-uniform system will no longer dissuade the exportation
of products. Additionally, the uniform provisions and intensive enforcement
mechanisms in the TPP will prevent the distribution of infringing products, and
producers within the United States will then increase exports to fill the resulting
deficit in products.
As detailed above, the TPP presents American patent-intensive industries
with the opportunity to expand their growth. As production of existing
products increases and new products are invented, the patent-intensive
industries will continue to increase their contribution to the United States’ GDP
and the number of jobs these industries create within the United States.
Through the implementation of the TPP, the United States will accrue benefits
to domestic production and employment.
147 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART: CALENDAR
YEARS 1963–2014 (2015) (indicating that patent grants increased from 302,948 in 2013 to 326,033
in 2014, a 7.6% increase).
148 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 1.
149 Derek Scissors, Grading the Trans-Pacific Partnership, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Dec.
9, 2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads//2015/12/Grading-the-Trans-Pacific-Partne
rship-on-trade.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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E. THE TPP IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE TPP

During the 2016 campaign for President of the United States, free trade
agreements took center stage in the discussion. First, Democratic hopeful
Bernie Sanders bemoaned the dangers of the TPP during the Democratic
primary.152 Then, during the general election, Donald Trump began to echo
some of Senator Sanders’s hostility toward free trade. In June 2016, Donald
Trump gave a speech in which he vowed to either renegotiate or withdraw from
NAFTA and to withdraw from the TPP.153 However, Trump’s criticisms were
focused more intently on convincing voters that free trade agreements were at
fault for job loss in the United States,154 rather than any complaints about the
form of modern trade agreements, which incorporate several different topics.
However, with Donald Trump winning the election, it is unlikely that TPP will
become law in the United States.155 Further demonstrating the likely demise of
the TPP, several senators have announced that the TPP will not pass through
the lame duck Congress before President Obama’s term ends.156
Despite these setbacks towards the ratification of the TPP, the arguments
made in this Note are still applicable. It is unlikely that the template of modern
trade treaties will change significantly because of Trump’s election. The
arguments regarding the economic benefits that would accrue to patentintensive industries will continue to foster a desire to protect domestic patentintensive industries during the negotiation of international trade agreements.
Additionally, the loss of status in Southeast Asia and the possibility of China’s
resurgence in the area could lead to the resuscitation of the TPP, as the United
States will likely want to continue to check Chinese political and economic
growth in the region.157
152 See, e.g., Arnie Seipel, Sanders Centers Platform Fight on Trans-Pacific Trade Deal, NPR (July 3,
2016, 12:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/03/484574128/sanders-centers-platform-fight-o
n-trans-pacific-trade-deal.
153 Russell Berman, Trump’s Shockingly Specific Speech on Trade, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/Donald-trumps-shockingly-specific-speec
h-on-trade/489194.
154 Id.
155 See Fact Check: Donald Trump’s First 100 Days Action Plan, NPR (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.
npr.org/2016/11/10/501597652/fact-check-donald-trumps-first-100-days-action-plan.
156 Elise Laboot & Nicole Gaouette, TPP defeat, future of US–Asian alliances sour Obama’s final trip
(Nov. 14, 2016, 8:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/14/politics/tpp-trade-deal-trump-oba
ma-trip.
157 Id. See also Ian Talley, Trump’s Vow to Target China’s Currency Could be First Step to Trade War,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-pledge-toget-tough-on-china-raises-threat-of-trade-war-1478804077 (demonstrating that the Trump
Administration will likely take a hard line on issues concerning the rise of China).
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While the current climate lends an air of uncertainty to the future of trade
agreements, it is unlikely that trade agreements will significantly change in the
coming years. Nations have been committed to liberalizing trade since the end
of World War II, with the ratification of GATT 1947.158 Additionally, for the
past twenty-five years, nations around the world have entered into agreements
which combine traditional trade topics with other provisions, including
intellectual property provisions. It is unlikely that the current setback to the
TPP will change the template that has developed in the past twenty-five years.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since negotiations began on the TPP, the agreement has faced extensive
criticism. Many parties were concerned the agreement would significantly alter
the international patent regime established in TRIPS. However, the TPP does
not materially alter the existing scheme for the patentability of products and
patent enforcement. Instead, the treaty merely clarifies ambiguous provisions in
TRIPS, while United States domestic provisions will remain unchanged.
Additionally, the TPP’s drafters took steps to alleviate the public health
concerns surrounding the treaty by explicitly allowing for patent exceptions to
protect human health and life. The agreement will allow countries to reject
product patents when granting the patent would threaten human health or life,
either by invoking the exceptions in Article 18.37(3) or Article 18.50(3) and the
Doha Declaration. Additionally, the TPP allows countries to continue using the
compulsory patent licensing scheme under TRIPS Article 31.
Finally, the TPP will have minimal effect on the existing patent regime in the
United States, as the domestic regime already conforms to the TRIPS
agreement. Yet the TPP will create a large, uniform international market, which
approaches the rigorous patent standards found in the United States. These
raised standards will allow domestic patent-intensive industries to increase their
exports. Subsequently, these industries will continue to grow and increase
domestic employment levels and GDP. These benefits, combined with the
alleviation of public health concerns, demonstrate that the TPP patent
provisions will greatly benefit the United States.
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